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NOTE
FEDERAL CONTRACT COMMON LAW AND
ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
A WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code presently governs the pur-
chase and sale of "goods" within forty-nine states, the District of Columbia,
and the Virgin Islands. 2 Despite this impressive uniformity, federal contracts
for the purchase and sale of goods 3 are governed exclusively by federal law 4
in the form of federal statutes,' administrative regulation,' and judicially
created common law.' In addition, disputes arising from the performance of
federal contracts are resolved through a contract dispute procedure different
from that used in resolving ordinary commercial disputes.' The widespread
adoption and use of Article 2 provisions within the states to govern ordinary
commercial transactions highlights the uniqueness of federal contract law and
spurs reappraisal of the rationale supporting such federal individuality.
Before such a reappraisal may begin, however, current federal policy
must be identified. While Article 2 provisions have played a part in the res-
olution of federal contract actions since 1964, 9
 the present status of the Code
U.C.C.	 2-105(1) provides in relevant part:
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8)
and things in action.
2
 1 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 1 (West 1977).
3
 Federal contracts are usually classified either with respect to the object
sought to be accomplished (such as the purchase of supplies or construction of build-
ings), by particular payment arrangements (such as fixed-price contracts), or in accor-
dance with the particular legal form (such as a purchase order or requirements con-
tract). See 2 J. MCBRIDE & T. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, § 18-10 (1978). Since
this note focuses upon the use of U.C.C. Article 2 as federal contract law, however, the
term "federal contract" will be limited herein to federal purchase or sale of "goods" as
defined within U.C.C. 2-105(1). See note 1 supra.
• United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
• See 41 U.S.C. ** 5-412 (1976).
6
 See 41 C.F.R. ** 1-1 to 60-741 (1977).
United States v. Standard Rice Co., Inc., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
• See generally Anthony and White, Contract Suit Practice and Procedures in the
United States Court of Claims, 49 NO RE DAME LAW. 276 (1976).
9
 John C. Kohler Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1974); North-
ern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Everett Plywood and Door
Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl. 1969); General Electric Co., 652 C.C.H.
Bd. Cont. App. 23,343, 23,457-58 (1BCA 1965); Mazur Bros. & Jaffe Fish Co., 65-2
C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,303, 23,305 (VACAB 1965); Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 1964
C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 20,869, 20,877 (ASBCA 1964).
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as federal contract law is not clear. Three federal circuit courts 10 and various
boards of contract appeal" have specifically named the U.C.C. as a source for
federal contract common law formulation. Nevertheless, the Court of Claims
has never referred to Article 2 as a source for the formulation of federal
common law. Instead, the Court of Claims has termed Article 2 provisions
merely "applicable" in the resolution of federal contract disputes.' 2 In addi-
tion, that court appears to have taken positive steps to distinguish Article 2
provisions from federal contract common law, and to limit their relevance
within federal contracts.
Despite this confusing facade, a careful examination of relevant case law
reveals four basic approaches towards Article 2 utilization in federal contract
disputes. First, Article 2 provisions have been rejected outright where incon-
sistent with existing federal precedent." Second, Code logic and provisions
have been used solely to support consistent federal contract law.' 4 Third,
specific Article 2 provisions have been used to balance federal and private
interests while preserving the force of prior federal case law." Fourth,
specific Article 2 provisions have been integrated into federal contract com-
mon law when no significant federal interest or policy has been involved and
no relevant federal case law has existed."
Against this patchwork of policies, wholesale judicial acceptance ' 7 and
application of the Uniform Commercial Code as federal contract common law
" Gardiner Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.
1973); Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir.
1966); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
" Mazur Bros. Se Jaffe Fish Co., 65-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,303 (VACAB
1965); Carpenter Steel Co., 65-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 22,944 (AECBCA 1965); Fed-
eral Pacific Electric Co., 1964 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 21,582 (IBCA 1964); Reeves
Soundcraft Corp., 1964 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 20,869 (ASBCA 1964).
" John C. Kohler Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1360, 1367 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
13 See, e.g., Federal Electric Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1377, 1382 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
"4 See, e.g., Cities Service Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306, 1317-18
(Ct. Cl. 1977).
15 See, e.g., Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546, 553 (Ct. Cl.
1972); Everett Plywood and Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425, 429 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
' 6 See, e.g., John C. Kohler Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1360, 1367 (Ct. Cl.
1974).
17 Federal courts in applying U.C.C. provisions as federal law have used the
term "adopt" to describe their action. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stated in United States v. Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 590 (6th Cir.
1978) that with respect to FHA security transactions, "the U.C.C. should be adopted as
the relevant federal common law." Since in the more usual and, perhaps, more ap-
propriate sense the term "adopt" is used to describe the application of particular state
law as federal law in lieu of formulating a uniform federal rule, see Note, Adopting State
law as the Federal Rule Of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1976), within
this note "adoption" will refer to this familiar policy of applying existing state law as
the federal rule. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct, 1448, 1458
(1979). In contrast, the term "acceptance" of Code provisions will be used when con-
sidering a general policy of looking to Code provisions in the formulation of uniform
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appears desirable. Such action, it is argued, would promote the interests of
simplicity and uniformity in contractual relations.'" It must be remembered,
however, that the complexity of an issue is not reduced by simplifying the law
governing that issue. Federal courts have acknowledged the utility of Article 2
provisions within particular contract actions. These courts have also quite
properly refused to defer to the U.C.C. in the formulation of federal contract
common law. Important national interests and express Congressional policies
distinguish federal contracts from ordinary commercial transactions. While
Article 2 should be considered as a source of concise, workable, modern con-
tract law, federal courts should not abandon existing federal contract prece-
dent simply to achieve speculative uniformity and simplicity.
This note will first outline the conceptual and legal bases of federal com-
mon law. The sources available for common law formulation will then be
examined in light of issues which may affect common law content as ulti-
mately formulated. Next, a brief explanation of the federal system within
which the boards of contract appeal, the federal district and circuit courts,
and the Court of Claims develop and apply federal contract common law will
be provided. The utilization of Article 2 provisions in federal contract actions
then will be examined in an effort to define the present status of Article 2 as
federal contract common law and to identify the rationale for each acceptance
or rejection of Code provisions. Finally, these policies will be evaluated in light
of the nature of federal common law and the needs of contracting parties in
general. As a result of this analysis, three conclusions will be drawn. First,
neither the legal nor the conceptual basis of federal common law absolutely
precludes judicial utilization of Article 2 provisions as federal contract com-
mon law. Second, although federal courts have utilized the U.C.C. as a clear,
concise, and valuable source for federal common law formulation, Article 2
has not been judicially accepted as the federal common law of contracts. Fi-
nally, the nature of federal procurement precludes wholesale replacement of
existing federal contract precedent with Article 2 provisions, although the
Code can and should be used to insure the commercial relevancy of federal
contract case law.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR THE CREATION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. The Legal Basis
An important issue which has stubbornly plagued the concept of federal
common law from its inception is the relationship between federal and state
federal common law. While federal courts cannot legislatively accept the entire U.C.C.
at any one time, they can look to the Code in uniform common law formulation as a
matter of policy. See United States v. Rurnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 590 (6th Cir.
1978); Mills Morris Co. of Miss. v. Scanlon, 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1971).
" See Note, Application of the Uniform Commercial Code lo Federal Government Con-
tracts: Doing Business on Business Terms, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 395, 407-11 (1974).
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judicial power; specifically, when may a federal court disregard state law and
formulate federal common law. On the same day that the Supreme Court, in
Erie R.R.Co. v. Tompkins," overruled Swift v. Tyson 20 by declaring that "[t]here
is no federal general common law," 21 the Court reversed a decision by the
Colorado Supreme Court which adversely affected interstate water rights. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in Hinderlider v. LaPlata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,'
stated that "whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between ... two states is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.""
General common law, which federal courts had been formulating and apply-
ing to the states in response to Swift, thus was succinctly distinguished from
common law specialized in its application to particular federal issues. 24 Jus-
tice Brandeis's sole reason for separating federal from general common law
was the existence of a recognized federal question. 25 In each of the next four
years, the Court consistently applied this specialized federal common law, but
with equal consistency declined to supply an explicit conceptual founda-
tion. 26
 Finally, with the landmark case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,"
the Supreme Court set forth a logical framework upon which the doctrine of
federal common law could be rested.
In Clearfield, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia had paid $24.20
to the Clearfield Trust Co. pursuant to a legitimate government check bearing
1 " 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a
district court decision which ignored state common law and found the defendant rail-
road company liable for negligence on the basis of federally interpreted general law.
Id. at 70. In so doing, the Erie Court ordered that a determination of liability be based
on the law of the state in which the accident occurred, including unwritten state com-
mon law formulated by that state's courts. Id. at 80.
20 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court first decided that a
preexisting debt constituted valuable consideration for the acceptance of a negotiable
instrument. The Court then held that state court decisions were not "laws" as defined
by the judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, and, therefore, were not binding upon federal
courts. Id. at 17-18.
" 304 U.S. at 78.
22 304 U.S. 92 (1938), rev'g 101 Colo. 73 (1937).
2 ' 304 U.S. at 110.
24
 The term "specialized common law" was coined by Judge Friendly in his
article entitled In Praise of Erie—And of The New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
383, 407 (1964).
23 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110.
2 " See Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-53
(1939) (independent federal rule applicable to determine state's obligation to pay in-
terest on improper tax levy); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940) (legal
consequences which flow from acts declared unlawful under the National Bank Act are
federal and not state questions); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289,
296-97 (1941) (rule governing interest to be paid as damages for delayed payment of a
contractual obligation to the United States not controlled by state statute or local com-
mon law); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 456-62
(1942) (liability of federally insured bank on note is to be determined in accordance
with federal, not state law).
27 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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a forged endorsement. Clearfield Trust, as a good faith holder in due course,
had no knowledge of the forgery. Sixteen months after payment, government
officials discovered the forgery and demanded reimbursement. Clearfield
Trust refused and the government sued. 28 The district court dismissed this
suit, holding that Pennsylvania law barred recovery due to unreasonable de-
lay. 29 In his opinion reversing the district court's decision, Justice Douglas
explained the Supreme Court's rationale governing the application of federal
common law.
The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper
which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law. When
the United States disperses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising
a constitutional function or power.... The authority to issue the
check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the
United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania
or of any other state.... The duties imposed upon the United States
and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their
roots in the same federal sources.... In the absence of an applicable
Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards.3°
The authority of federal courts to formulate and apply federal common law,
therefore, ultimately stems from the power of Congress to legislate in that
area. The distinction between federal and state common law is a reflection of
the distinction between federal and state legislation.
Inherent in Justice Douglas's explanation, and supported by subsequent
case law, are three conclusions of general importance. If an activity under
consideration is ultimately authorized by the federal Constitution, either di-
rectly or through the lawmaking authority of Congress, then the validity of
such activity is not dependent upon state authority and state law cannot affect
its operation. 3 ' Instead, such activity is federal and governed solely by fed-
eral law. 32 In the absence of relevant federal statutes, the federal judiciary
may formulate and apply to such federally authorized activity federal
specialized common law. 33 The Court in Clearfield, for example, was free to
formulate and apply federal common law because the disputed check was au-
thorized by federal rather than state lekislation. 34 This simple formula, how-
28 Id. at 364-65.
" Id. at 366.
3° Id. at 366-67.
31 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1947).
32 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1943).
33 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947).
34 Justice Rehnquist, concurring in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1972), made the following statements:
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, [citation omitted] this Court held
that federal common law governed the rights and duties of the United
States "on commercial paper which it issues ...." The interest in havinK
those rights governed by a rule which is uniform across the Nation was the
basis of that decision.
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ever, merely establishes the jurisdictional limits of federal common law. Fol-
lowing the initial identification of federal interests sufficiently important to
require the application of federal law, a more difficult task—that of formulat-
ing the appropriate federal rule—remains to be considered.
B. Alternative Methods for Establishing the Content
of Federal Common Law
Two methods are available to establish the content of federal specialized
common law. First, a federal court may simply adopt and apply state law, 35 or
second, the court may formulate a federal rule independent of state influence
and control.' The advantages of each alternative are readily distinguishable.
Federal adoption of state law permits a balance between federal programs and
important state interests. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.," for example,
the Supreme Court held that federal law governs the priority of liens stem-
ming from federal lending programs." Nevertheless, the Court refused to
"override intricate state laws of general applicability on which private creditors
base their daily commercial transactions." 39 Instead, the Court directed that
"nondiscriminatory state laws" 4° be adopted and applied as federal commer-
cial common law.'" In doing so, the Supreme Court balanced the objectives
of federal lending programs with the significant state interest of governing
internal commercial procedures.
Although federally adopted state law is held to govern not by virtue of its
authority as state law but solely as federal law, 42 serious consequences
nevertheless result from this approach. Since laws vary from state to state,
Id. at 607. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion, which is incorrect, illustrates a common mis-
interpretation of Clearfield. The Court in Clearfield determined two separate issues:
first, that federal courts are competent "to declare the governing law in an area com-
prising issues substantially related to an established program of government opera-
tion," Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion In The Choice
of National And Slate Rules For Decision, 105 PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957) (hereinafter
cited as Mishkin); second, that uniformity, of law may be required by the nature of the
federal interests at stake. It should he emphasized that the rationale for applying fed-
eral common law is not based upon a need for federal uniformity. See United States v.
• Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1457-58 (1979); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580-81 (1956); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204,
209-10 (1946).
39 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1458 (1979).
39 Id.; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306, 308-11 (1947);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
" 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1979).
" Id. at 1457-58.
39 Id. at 1459.
40 Id. at 1465.	 •
41
 Id. See also Reconstruction Finance' Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204,
209 (1946); Mishkin, supra note 34, at 804.
42 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296-97 (1941); Board of Comm'rs
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939). See also Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 529 (1954).
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adoption of state law may sacrifice all chance of achieving federal uniformity.
A decision to apply state law as federal law necessarily results in a federal rule
the content of which may vary "depending upon the State where the relevant
transaction takes place."" The probability of encountering interstate diver-
sity logically increases whenever issues of significant state interest are in-
volved. In addition to this threat to federal uniformity, federal courts may
also surrender an important degree of independence by adopting state law.
Federally adopted state law does not shed its basic role as local rule nor es-
cape the reach of local control." Such laws remain subject to change by state
legislatures whenever perceptions by the state of its own interests change. 45
Federally adopted state law, therefore, inherits an element of instability, since
state law may be changed even after federal adoption. 46
In contrast, federal common law independently formulated by federal
courts may be tailored to meet special federal needs. In addition, by focusing
strictly upon federal concerns, federal courts may achieve a high degree of
legal uniformity. A good example of these advantages may be found in Clear-
field where the Supreme Court chose to formulate federal common law, de-
claring that the "desirability of a uniform rule is plain."" The Court then
held that the payor of a federal check bearing a forged endorsement would
be held liable on the check unless actual damage resulted from the drawee's
failure to notify the payor of the forgery. 48
 Pennsylvania law, which barred
recovery whenever unreasonable delay in giving notice was shown," was thus
rejected and replaced with a federal rule more suited to federal banking in-
terests.
A decision favoring the formulation of an independent federal rule,
moreover, does not automatically disqualify state law as a source." Since the
43
 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966) (dictum). See also Clearfield
Trust Co, v. United States, 318 U.S. at 367; United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d
712, 716 (3d Cir. 1964); Mishkin, supra note 34, at 805-06.
44 Mishkin, supra note 34, at 806.
45
 The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods noted that the FHA had kept itself
informed of statutory changes in state U.C.C. law. 99 S. Ct. at 1460. The Court relied
upon this fact as an indication that federal adoption of state law would not administra-
tively burden federal loan programs. Id.
48
 While states may change their laws following federal adoption, federal
courts are not required to apply as federal law hostile state law. Kimbell Foods, 99 S. Ct.
at 1462 n.37; United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 602-04.
" 318 U.S. at 367.
48
 Id. at 370.
" Id. at 366.
5°
 This conclusion is not as obvious as it may at first appear. Professor Hart, in
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. Rev. 489 (1954), made the
following statement;
What is ironical is that this trend toward federal uniformity, involving
as it does the sterilization pro tante of both state courts and state legislatures
as agencies of growth in the law, has been accompanied by a trend toward
diffidence in the creative exercise of federal judicial power after federal
concern has been asserted.
•
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formulation of an independent federal rule is merely the judicial creation of
common law, all of the traditional sources for common law formulation are
available to federal courts. 5 ' The logic and content of particular state laws,
therefore, may be incorporated into independent federal common law. As
explained by the Sixth Circuit: "The formulation of a uniform federal rule
does not require that the wisdom of the states be disregarded, and the federal
rule may correspond to the rule applied in many states."" By utilizing state
law merely as one source in the creation of independent federal rules, federal
courts can avoid the problems of interstate legal diversity as well as insure the
present and future consistency of the formulated law with federal policies.
While state law is subject to change by the states in response to state perceived
priorities, uniform federal law incorporating state law principles changes only
at the hands of the federal courts or Congress. 53 As a result, some federal
circuits have attempted to develop a uniform, independent federal law with-
out abandoning concern for federal/state balance. 54
Since the formulation of an independent federal rule does not imply fed-
eral insensitivity to state interests, the choice between state law adoption and
judicial formulation should depend upon the federal need for independence
and uniformity. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact and has de-
veloped a three step approach to determine when it is suitable to adopt state
law. First, the federal need for uniformity should be weighed.' 5 If this need
is not great, then the degree of conflict between existing state law and impor-
tant federal policies must be determined. 5" A final consideration is the rele-
Id. at 534. From this remark it appears that Professor Hart considered state law
excluded from consideration once a decision is made to formulate a uniform federal
rule.
51
 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469-70
(1942) (Jackson, J. concurring).
52 United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Mills
Morris Co. of Miss. v. Scanlon, 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971); Fruehauf Corp. v.
Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1966); Boccardo v. United
States, 341 F. Supp. 858, 862 (N.D.Cal. 1972).
" See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1971); Cas-
sidy Commission Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875, 878-79 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967).
" In United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that rights and duties stemming from FHA loan transactions
were to be governed by uniform federal law. Id. at 808-09. Nevertheless, the court saw
"no reason ... for fashioning a specialized, esoteric body of federal law ...." Id. at
809. Instead, the court decided to be "guided by the principles set forth in Article 9
and other relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 810. The court
noted that "[flu this fashion the federal law governing FHA loans and the state law of
secured transactions will coalesce to reinforce each other." Id. at 811. See also United
States v. Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1978). This compromise
approach was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. at 1458-59.
55
	 e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
56
 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1458 (1979);
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 596-99 (1973).
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vance and importance of traditional state , interests." Once a federal court
has decided to independently formulate a uniform federal rule, however, ad-
ditional policy considerations directly influence the court's choice of federal
common law content.
C. The Content of Uniform Federal Law: Policy Considerations
Two identifiable policies guide judicial formulation of federal common
law content: the promotion and the protection or federal interests. Federal
courts promote federal interests by choosing the rule most likely to produce
the smooth operation of whatever federal program is under consideration. In
United States v. Hext, 58 for example, the Fifth Circuit first decided that "(amn
FHA loan is nothing more nor less than a secured transaction ..." 59 and then
accepted Article 9 as the governing federal rule since "it is evident that the
principle fount of general commercial law governing secured transactions is
now Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code." 6 ° As such, the Code was a
logical choice to govern federal secured transactions.
The second, more controversial policy—that of federal interest
protection—may first appear as part of a court's rationale for applying fed-
eral common law," and later direct the court's choice of uniform federal rule
" United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, 357 (1966). See generally Note,
Adopting Stale Law as the Federal Rule Of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Cm. L. REV.
823 (1976).
58
 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 809.
60 Id. at 810.
" The Court in Clearfield carefully distinguished the rationale for applying
federal common law from considerations affecting that law's substance. Rights and
duties stemming from federal sources were held to require federal law to govern their
exercise. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. at 366-67. After the initial
determination of federal law applicability, the desirability of a uniform federal rule
over state law adoption was considered, but solely to determine the substance of the
appropriate federal law. Id. at 367. Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), found federal law applicable to
govern the liability of a private tortfeasor for expenses stemming from injuries sus-
tained by a federal soldier. The Court based its decision on the government's right to
protect both "the relation between persons in the service and the Government" and the
federal treasury. Id. at 306. In response to this "protection" criteria, the desirability of
a uniform federal rule to protect significant federal interests from interstate diversity
was itself held by federal courts to form the principle justification for applying federal
common law. Compare United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-16 (1963) with
United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755, 757-59 (1962). Recently the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1457-58
(1979), reaffirmed the distinction between initial identification of federal law applica-
bility and the subsequent determination of that law's content. After noting that "the
priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs must be determined with
reference to federal law," id. at 1457, the Court proceeded to adopt state law as the
federal rule. "Because the state commercial codes 'furnish convenient solutions in no
way inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest[s]' [citation omitted]
we decline to override intricate state laws of general applicability on which private
creditors base their daily commercial transactions." Id. at 1459. While' federal law
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content. Thus, federal courts may justifiably reject state law adoption in order
to protect federal interests from interstate diversity and potential state/federal
conflicts. 62 This protection policy, however, may also disrupt the balance be-
tween federal and state interests and result in "a specialized, esoteric body of
federal law ...."" In United States v. Bank of America National Trust and Sav-
ings Association," for example, a federal district court refused to apply as fed-
eral law U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(0 66 to a case in which two United States Navy
personnel had issued valid government checks payable to a third party, had
fraudulently endorsed the checks themselves, and had received payment from
the defendant bank. 66 The defendant claimed that "federal courts must look
to the general commecial law at the time of the transaction in fashioning a
`federal law.' " 67 Since the principles of U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c) were followed in
all fifty states, the defendant argued, the federal rule should correspond."
The district court, in rejecting this argument, interpreted Clearfield as creating
a "duty of the federal courts to choose 'a federal rule designed to protect a
federal right.' " 69 While the court acknowledged that "the need for uniform-
ity [would] be met with the adoption of either body of law,"" "the duty of
determining the federal interest in protecting the government's rights in its
commercial paper" 71 precluded application of the U.C.C." The choice of
common law content, therefore, was not based upon the promotion of a fed-
eral policy nor upon the protection of federal uniformity. Instead, the district
court applied a law best suited to protect an important federal interest—here
the national treasury.
applicability, therefore, should not rest solely upon the desirability of a uniform fed-
eral rule, the protection of federal interests nevertheless appears to be a basic purpose
for applying federal common law. In Kimbell, for example, the Court noted that "fed-
eral interests are sufficiently implicated to warrant the protection of federal law." Id. at
1457-58 (emphasis added).
62 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-11 (1947); United
States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 367. Compare United States v. Sommerville,
324 F.2d 712, 714-17 (3d Cir. 1973) with United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 807-11
(5th Cir. 1971).
63 Hext, 444 F.2d at 809.
84 288 F. Supp. 343 (N.D.Cal. 1968), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1971). In
affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit relied not upon the establish-
ment of a unique federal interest, but rather on the doctrine of stare decisis. 438 F.2d at
1214.
65 U.C.C. § 3-405 (I):
An endorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is ineffec-
tive if:
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him
with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such
interest.
86 288 F. Supp. at 344-45.
67 Id. at 347.
813 Id.
" Id., citing Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 367 (district court's emphasis).
7° Id.
" Id.
72 Id. at 348.
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No rationale exisits for the formulation of totally self-serving federal law.
Where federal and state interests are not in conflict, federal common law,
though independent and uniform, should reflect a balance. The Supreme
Court has implied that federal interests must be balanced against those of
parties affected by the formulation of federal common law. In United States v.
National Exchange Bank of Baltimore," the government sued to recover an addi-
tional amount of money paid on a federal check drawn by an authorized
federal agent and validly endorsed, but which had been altered before pre-
sentation. Justice Holmes, declaring that "[Ole United States does business on
business terms," held the government liable. 74
 The Court noted: "We are of
opinion that the United States is not excepted from the general rule by the
largeness of its dealings...." 75
 This theme of balancing federal and private
interests appeared later in Clearfield, where the Court seemed to balance ar-
guments for federal exemption as a drawee against the general commercial
interest of-subsequent holders in due course in receiving prompt notice of
forgery." Having decided that the government as drawee was entitled to
recover money paid on a federal check bearing a forged endorsement, the
Court declared that "[title United States as drawee of commercial paper
stands in no different light than any other drawee" 77
 and held that delay in
discovery and notice of forgery which resulted in actual damage to the payor
would be a defense in a subsequent action brought by the drawee. 78
 Accord-
ing to Clearfield, the presence of federal interests sufficiently important to
mandate the formulation of uniform, federally controlled common law may
yet lack the justification necessary for the creation of federally protective law."
D. Federal Contract Common Law:
Application of the Theoretical Framework
In light of the preceding discussion, two basic approaches to federal ap-
plication of Uniform Commercial Code provisions are available. Federal
courts could simply adopt Article 2 as extant state law." Such a decision
would result in automatic Code application in all federal contract actions. Ex-
ceptions would be made on a case by case basis to eliminate those provisions
considered hostile to federal interests." As an alternative, federal courts
could reject state law adoption in favor of formulating an independent body
of federal contract law. In this event, the courts would approach Code utiliza-
tion in one of two ways. First, Article 2 could be accepted in its entirety by
73 270 U.S. 527 (1926).
74
 Id. at 534 - 35.
" Id. at 535.
" 318 U.S. at 363, 369-70.'
" Id. at '369.
78 Id.
79 Accord, United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1458-59, 1464-
65 (1979); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971).
8° Kimbell Foods, 99 S. Ct. at 1465 (1979)
81
 DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 58 1 (1956). See also Mishkin, supra note
34, at 805-06.
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federal courts as a coherent, comprehensive body of federal contract princi-
ples. 82 This approach differs from state law adoption in only one important
respect: accepted Code provisions would neither reflect interstate diversity
nor be subject to individual state modifications." Exceptions would neverthe-
less be made by federal courts on a case by case basis to eliminate inappro-
priate or hostile provisions. 84
 The second approach involves a gradual
integration of particular Article 2 provisions into the existing body of federal
contract common law. 85 Although the Code would not be applied automati-
cally in this way, the familiarity and dependability of existing contract law
would not be sacrificed. Article 2 provisions would be available as a supple-
ment and as an aid in evaluating traditional federal contract principles.
As discussed earlier, federal need for uniformity is a primary consider-
ation in a federal court's decision to adopt state law or formulate an indepen-
dent federal rule. One year after Clearfield, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. County of Allegheny," established guidelines for the development of
federal contract common law and indicated a need for federal uniformity. In
that case special machinery had been purchased by the government and
leased to a private manufacturer for the production of military ordnance.
Title to this machinery was to remain at all times with the government." As
a result of this contract, however, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, increased
the manufacturer's tax assessment by an amount equal to the assessed value of
the government machinery. 88 In defense of its action, the County claimed in
part that federal contracts are "subject to the legal rules applicable to private
transactions." 89 Since, under Pennsylvania law, "transfer of title to be good
as against subsequent purchasers and lienors must be accompanied by delivery
of possession," 90 the County argued that it was taxing private and not federal
property.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that "Wile validity
and construction of contracts through which the United States is exercising its
constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of
the parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions
of federal law not controlled by the law of any state." 91 In addition, the
Court recognized that federal contract law should be not only independent of
state control, but internally uniform as well. "The purpose of the Supremacy
" See, e.g., United States v. Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 590 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971).
83 Hext, 444 F.2d at 810.
84
	
DeSylva V. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); United States v.
Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587, 590 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hext, 444
F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971); Mishkin, supra note 34, at 805-06.
" See, e.g., John C. Kohler Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1360, 1367 (Ct. Cl.
1974); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
" 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
87 Id. at 178-79.
88 Id. at 179-80.
89 Id. at 181.
9° Id.
91 Id. at 183.
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Clause was to avoid the introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts
which would follow if the Government's general authority were subject to
local controls." 92 Here, as in Clearfield, the Court estabished the jurisdiction
of federal common law and rejected state law adoption as a means of provid-
ing that law's content. Consequently, federal contracts are to be governed by
federal law—including judicially formulated federal common law.
In determining the content of federal contract common law, federal
courts are guided by the established need to promote and protect federal
interests. With respect to federal contracts, the Supreme Court has clearly
indicated that federal contract common law should reflect a balance between
federal and general commercial interests. In United States v. Standard Rice
Co.," the government had contracted to buy rice at a price which included
applicable federal taxes. When a processing tax subsequently was held invalid,
the government attempted to reduce the contract price proportionately by
refusing to refund an overpayment of income tax owed the contractor." The
Court refused to allow the government to make an adjustment in contract
price not permitted by the contract terms. "When problems of the interpreta-
tion of its contracts arise the law of contracts governs." 95 With language rem-
iniscent of the "business on business terms" logic of National Exchange Bank
of Baltimore, 96 the Court warned that even wItere national procurement
policies were concerned, federal courts are not free to formulate excessively
protective federal contract law. "Although there will be exceptions, in general,
the United States as contractor must be treated as other contractors under
analogous situations." 97 These words appear to require the formulation of
federal contract law patterned after modern commercial principles and re-
sponsive to changes and developments in state contract law—including Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Court's statement, however, cannot
be construed to direct federal use of U.C.C. provisions. While federal common
contract law should reflect legal trends within the commercial world, it must
also be consistent with Congressional policy and national interests. By refusing
to provide clear guidelines, the Supreme Court passed responsibility for
balancing federal and commercial interests to the individual courts responsible
for the formulation of federal contract common law.
II. FEDERAL CONTRACT COMMON LAW AND ARTICLE 2
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In light of the Supreme Court's directives in Clearfield and Allegheny
County, federal courts are responsible for formulating an independent and
uniform body of federal contract common law. This law must not only pro-
mote the smooth operation of federal procurement policies, but must also,
92 Id.
" 323 U.S. 106 (1944).
94 Id. at 107-08.
45 Id. at 111.
96 270 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1926).
97 323 U.S. at 111.
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whenever possible, reflect a balance between federal and general commercial
interests." Within this section, federal use of Article 2 provisions to achieve
both of these goals will be examined. The resolution of federal contract dis-
putes and the formulation of federal contract law, however, is largely per-
formed within the unique context of a federal contract dispute mechanism. 99
The structure of this mechanism should be understood before the use of Ar-
ticle 2 provisions in formulating federal contract common law is considered.
A. Procedures and Forums for Resolving Federal Contract Disputes
As with all contract disputes, federal contract actions may be initiated by
either contracting party. Unlike most contract disputes, however, specific pro-
cedures are required for settlement under federal law. These procedures vary
depending on the characterization of an action as either a disputes clause
claim or breach of contract claim. Action on a federal contract containing a
clause specifying what relief can be granted or the manner of resolving dis-
putes is characterized as a disputes clause claim—as a claim arising "under
the contract.' ,100 If such a dispine cannot be resolved by agreement, the con-
tracting officer decides the issue. This decision may be appealed to the head
of the appropriate procuring agency within 30 days by the contractor pur-
suant to the contract's dispute clause or, as often occurs, to a board of con-
tract appeal acting in the agency head's place."' Absent fraud or bad faith,
appeals to the Court of Claims from the decisions of authorized boards of
contract appeal may be initiated only by the aggrieved contractor.'" Judicial
review at this stage is strictly limited under the Wunderlich Act ' 93 to adminis-
trative conclusions of law and to those findings of fact which are "fraudulent
or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith, or [are] not supported by substantial evidence." 104 In addition, judicial
review of administrative fact-finding is strictly limited to review of the record.
No trial de novo is allowed at this stage, nor is the court permitted to substitute
its view for that of a board.'"
9a
	text and notes 73-79 supra.
" See generally Anthony and White, Contract Suit Practice and Procedures in the
United States Court of Claims, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 276 (1973).
10° Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 442 F.2d 364, 366-67 (Ct. Cl.
1971).
101 Disputes, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102-12 (1978). Validity of these provisions was first
upheld in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1878); accord, S&E Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1972).
S&E Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972); Roscoe-Ajax
Construction Co. v. United States, 499 F.2d 639, 644-45 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See also, Note,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS—The Government, Unable to Appeal Decisions of the Boards of
Contract Appeals, May Counterclaim Only Where Limited To The Disputes Raised In Contrac-
tor's Suit—Roscoe-Ajax Construction Co. v. United States, 43 GEO. WASH. L. 'Zvi. 647
(1975).
103 Wunderlich Act, §§ 1-2, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1976).
104 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
1 " United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 419-20 (1966);
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1963).
694	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 20:680
By contrast, breach of contract claims are not governed by a disputes
clause and may be brought directly before an appropriate federal court for a
de novo hearing. 106 Claims against the government not exceeding $10,000
may be filed in either the United States Court of Claims or a federal district
court.'" With respect to claims exceeding $10,000, the Court of Claims en-
joys exclusive jurisdiction.'" Appeals from decisions of the Court of Claims
can be taken only in the United States Supreme Court.'"
As a result of this dispute system, federal common contract law is formu-
lated on three separate levels: first, on an administrative level by the various
procuring agencies acting through their boards of contract appeal; second, on
a reviewing level by federal courts acting in accordance with the Wunderlich
Act; and, finally, on an independent basis by both the Court of Claims and
the various federal district and circuit courts. Because of the jurisdictional
limitations, however, the Court of Claims enjoys a more influential role than
the district and circuit courts in contract law formulation within contractor
initiated breach actions. Although parties seeking damages for government
breach of federal contracts may bring suit in federal district court, the
$10,000 maximum recovery ceiling limits the impact of district court deci-
sions. In contrast, government initiated suits for such claims as breach of con-
tract, breach of warranty, or annullment of contract may be freely brought in
federal district court with no recovery limitations.' 10
A significant result of this jurisdictional allocation is the isolation of ex-
pensive government defended contract claims from commercial trends preva-
lent within traditional contract forums. The jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims is limited to claims "against the United States ....""' As a result,
federal common contract law formulated by that court essentially determines
federal liability to individual contractors.' 12 Conversely, federal district and cir-
cuit courts shoulder the responsibility for determining private business liability
to government suit. These courts, unlike the Court of Claims, are regularly
exposed to the marketplace and to developing trends in general commercial
"6 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1976); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394, 412 (1966); Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 442 F.2d
364, 367 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
107 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1976).
108 Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
1 " 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1255 (1976).
" 0 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976).
1'1 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
112  The major exception to this rule occurs in renegotiation cases appealed to
the Court of Claims from the Renegotiation Board in which private contractors defend
against government allegations of excess profit. See eLykes Bros. Steamship Co. v.
United States, 459 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1972). See also Anthony and White, Contract Suit
Practice and Procedures in the U.S. Court of Claims, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 276, 281 -83
(1973). A second, less frequent exception occurs when a contractor's liability to the
government arises under the terms of his contract rather than by breach. Since such
cases are covered by the disputes clause, appeals from a contracting officer's determi-
nation of liability must be taken to the appropriate board of contract appeals. See
Liability of Delcher Brothers Storage Company, 70-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 39,875
(ASBCA 1970).
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law, thereby gaining experience in applying the Uniform Commercial Code
within the context of private contract actions. Since federal liability is largely
determined by the Court of Claims, it is reasonable to expect that federal
district and circuit courts, unburdened by the responsibility for protecting the
government from expensive suits and familiar with general commercial law,
would more readily apply Article 2 provisions as federal law. Even so, federal
circuit courts have largely followed the lead of the Court of Claims in for-
mulating federal contract common law.
B. Application of Article 2 in Practice
Although Article 2 provisions have been applied as federal common law
in all three federal contract forums, a review of relevant federal circuit court,
board of contract appeal and United States Court of Claims cases reveals that
the U.C.C. has not been accepted as the federal common law of contracts.
Instead, and at best, the Code stands as a valuable source for modern federal
contract law formulation. Two issues appear important in any decision to
utilize Article 2 as such a source. The first consideration is whether relevant
federal contract legislation, regulations, or case law already exist. Second, fed-
eral courts and boards determine whether proposed provisions appear likely
to preserve and enhance an equilibrium between federal and private interests.
In light of these concerns, case law within each of the three forums indicates
that Article 2 provisions are most likely to be utilized as federal contract law
in the absence of both important federal interests and applicable federal prec-
edent. The Court of Claims, however, has demonstrated a preference for
utilizing Article 2 provisions in resolving individual contract disputes solely to
insure the justified realization of underlying bargains.
1. Federal Circuit Courts
To date only the Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have
directly relied upon Article 2 provisions in formulating federal contract com-
mon law. 13 These courts have demonstrated a willingness to consider the
Code in the formulation of new federal contract law, but have made no at-
tempt to utilize Article 2 provisions to change or replace existing federal case
law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Wegematic Corp., 14 broke the ice in 1966 and utilized Article 2 as a
source for contract law formulation where controlling federal precedent was
unavailable. In Wegematic, an electronics corporation had failed to develop
and deliver a computer to the government as promised. The defendant
claimed that engineering difficulties rendered the contract unenforceable due
to impossibility of performance." 5 Finding the cases cited by the government
13 Gardiner Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1973);
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United
States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
1 " 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
15 Id. at 675.
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inconclusive on this issue, the court sought "guidance elsewhere," 116
 applied
U.C.C. § 2-615 17 as federal contract law, and found the government entitled
to damages for breach of contract on an assumption of risk theory. 11 Whil e
the court in Wegematic looked to Article 2 for guidance in formulating federal
contract common law, the court clearly did so by default. Only the absence of
any relevant federal precedent produced consideration of the Code.
Regardless of the reason, Article 2 had finally appeared as federal com-
mon law. Moreover, in dicta, Judge Friendly suggested a far more liberal ap-
proach to U.C.C. utilization than that actually taken.
When the states have gone so far in achieving the desired goal of a
uniform law governing commercial transactions, it would be a dis-
tinct disservice to insist on a different one for the segment of com-
merce, important but still small in relation to the total, consisting of
transactions with the United States."'
With this language Judge Friendly seemed to suggest that Article 2 be utilized
as a source of federal contract law not only in the absence of relevant prece-
dent, but as an instrument for federal contract law modernization and change
as well. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
heeded Judge Friendly's dicta and, in Transatlantic Financing Corporation v.
United States,'" took a definite step toward replacing obsolete federal contract
precedent with Code provisions.
In Transatlantic, the operator of a ship chartered to carry wheat from the
United States to Iran was forced to take a longer route due to Egypt's seizure
of the Suez Canal. Claiming dissolution of the original contract on impossibil-
ity grounds, the plaintiff sought recovery for additional expenses incurred on
a quantum meruit theory. 121 The district court had relied upon traditional
federal impossibility doctrine 122 to deny plaintiff's claim.' 23 The circuit
court, however, in recognition of the new approach to contractual impossibil-
1 " Id. at 676.
117 Id. at 676. U.C.C. § 2 -615 states:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation ...
a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery ... is not a breach of his duty under a
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made ....
" 8 360 F.2d at 674, 676.
119 Id.
12° 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' 2 ' Id. at 315.
122 The traditional federal impossibility doctrine provides that where an unex-
pected, supervening event does not totally prevent a party from performing under
contract, but merely increases the expense or difficulty of that performance, the con-
tracting party is not relieved from the duty to perform nor permitted extra compensa-
tion in the absence of evidence showing a reallocation of risk. See Transatlantic Financ-
ing Corp. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D.D.C. 1965).
1 " 259 F. Supp. at 728.
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ity being applied in general commercial contract litigation," 4
 relied heavily
upon U.C.C. § 2-614 123 and § 2-6l5 "8 to formulate a federal doctrine of
commercial impracticability. On the basis of this new formulation, the circuit
court denied the plaintiff's request for additional costs.' 27
 While the District
of Columbia Circuit did not replace obsolete federal contract law with Article
2 provisions, 128
 the court, in modernizing federal contract common law, did
turn to the Code for guidance.
Despite this promising start, Article 2 did not reappear in circuit court
decisions for seven years. Indeed, the 1973 citation of an Article 2 provision
as federal contract law by the Ninth Circuit in Gardiner Manufacturing Co. v.
United States,'" signalled the end of federal circuit court experimentation with
Article 2 provisions begun so enthusiastically with Wegematic. In Gardiner, a
subcontractor who had delivered merchandise to the government was denied
payment by a bankrupt contractor. He then brought suit for conversion
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 3 ° Citing
U.C.C. § 2-403,"' the court held that since title to the merchandise rested in
the government as a result of the primary contract, the subcontractor's claim
of conversion must fail.' 32
 The court, however, did not specify its reasons for
applying Code provisions, but merely characterized the U.C.C. as a source "to
which federal courts look in developing federal 'sales' law."'" Seven years
124
 See Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18
MICH. L. Rev. 589, 596 (1920); 6 WILLISTON CONTRACTS 1931-1979 (Rev. Ed. 1938);
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 293 (1916).
125 U.C.C. § 2-614(1) provides:
Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing, loading, or un-
loading facilities fail or an agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable or
the agreed manner of delivery otherwise becomes commercially impracti-
cable but a commercially reasonable substitute is available, such substitute
performance must be tendered and accepted.
'" See note 117 supra.
'" 363 F.2d at 319-20.
123
 Article 2 provisions were not directly applicable since the contract did not
concern the sale of goods. See U.C.C. 1-202: "Unless the context otherwise requires,
this Article applies to transactions in goods ...."
129
 479 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1973).
' 30 Id. at 40 citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
U.C.C. § 2-403 states in relevant part:
(1) ... A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though ...
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored.. ..
132
 479 F.2d at 41.
1 " Id. The recent district court case of United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426
F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1977), may support the theory that within the Ninth Circuit,
Code provisions will be considered only in the absence of relevant federal precedent.
In Humboldt, a company which had contracted with an Indian tribe to buy and clear
timber from Indian land declared bankruptcy before full performance. The Indians
subsequently sold the remaining timber and through the Bureau of Indian Affairs
filed a claim with the bankruptcy court for recovery of damages. Having first deter-
mined the issue to be governed by federal contract law, the court explained that in the
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after Wegematic, therefore, the Gardiner court utilized Article 2 in exactly the
same manner as had the Second Circuit. The Gardiner court's analysis exhib-
ited one signifciant difference, however. Gone were any proposals for merg-
ing the U.C.C. with federal contract law. Since the Gardiner decision, no fed-
eral district court or circuit court has relied upon an Article 2 provision to
resolve a federal contract claim. Federal circuit courts appear determined not
to utilize the U.C.C. in federal contract actions where relevant federal prece-
dent is available.
Two considerations may explain the reluctance of federal circuit courts to
change existing federal case law in favor of Article 2 provisions. First, federal
courts are infrequently faced with the task of deciding federal contract issues.
Since a federal contractor is obligated to comply with the decision of a con-
tracting officer pending appeal, the government is rarely forced to sue for
breach of contract.'" Alternatively, the most profitable contractor initiated
suits—those with claims exceeding $10,000—must be brought in the Court of
Claims."5 As a result, federal district and circuit courts may prefer to apply
existing federal precedent simply to preserve as much uniformity as possible.
Second, primary responsibility for determining government contract liability
to contractors falls upon the Court of Claims. 136 Federal district and circuit
courts may prefer to apply relevant federal precedent in simple deference to
that court's responsibility for balancing federal liability with the justified con-
absence of relevant legislation, federal contracts are construed in accordance with gen-
eral contract law. Id. at 294-95. The court then declared:
The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in fifty jurisdictions including
California, is a recognized source of general contract law. United States v.
Wegematic Corporation, 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966). In the absence
of federal cases on point, state statutory and decisional law may furnish a
convenient source for the general law of contracts to the extent that it does
not conflict with the federal interests ...."
Id. at 296-97. The court, however, failed to specify whether the U.C.C. is to be consid-
ered a source of general contract law separate from state law and thus exempt from
state law qualifications, whether the Code, though separate, nevertheless is governed
by the state law qualifications, or, whether the Code is simply to be considered state
law.
134
 The disputes clause contained in 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102-12 (1978) provides in
part that "Ip)ending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall pro-
ceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Con-
tracting Officer's decision." This clause has been interpreted by the Court of Claims as
protecting "an important interest of the Government by permitting it to continue to
receive needed supplies on schedule, despite disputes which might arise during per-
formance." Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 389 F.2d 424, 432-33 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (contractor who filled government order received after contract expiration
period held entitled to market value rather than contract price). Rather than simply
refuse performance, a dissatisfied federal contractor may fulfill his contractual obliga-
tion and bring suit in accordance with the disputes clause for additional compensation.
See Federal Electric Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1317, 1381-82 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974) (dispute clause held inapplicable since contractor claimed
contract unenforceable).
133
 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). See also Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d
1028, 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
138 Id.
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tractual expectations of federal contractors. Despite the present policy of ap-
plying Article 2 provisions only in the absence of relevant federal precedent,
Wegematic, Transatlantic Finance, and Gardiner established Article 2 as a source
for "developing federal sales law."'" An incidental result of this break-
through was an end to the confusion over the Code's federal status which had
previously existed among the boards of contract appeal.
2. Federal Boards of Contract Appeal
Since contractors may always appeal administrative determinations of con-
tract law to the Court of Claims,'" relevant federal court precedent dictates
the content of federal contract law applied by the various boards of contract
appeal. As a result, boards today follow the federal circuit policy of applying
U.C.C. provisions only in the absence of any relevant federal precedent. The
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), for example, relied in
Meeks Transfer Co. 139 upon traditional bailment law ' 4 ° as expressed by federal
admiralty courts and held a bailee not liable for federal property lost in a
warehouse fire. 1. 41
 In response to a government motion for reconsideration
contending U.C.C. applicability, the board remarked:
While we have not considered the Uniform Commercial Code as
enunciative of Federal Common Law, we have in the past looked to
this Code for guidance when there was no other federal precedent
available. Adequate legal precedent here being available, we do not
come to a consideration of the provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.'"
With these words the ASBCA rejected any suggestion that. Article 2 be consid-
ered federal contract law. The U.C.C. is merely one source of commercial
contract principles to be used by the boards in formulating new federal con-
tract law.
Such clear policy regarding Code usage was not always evident. The
Court of Claims in The Padblock Co. v. United States"' committed itself and the
various contract boards "to take account of the best in modern decision and
discussion" '" in formulating federal contract law. Responding to this direc-
tive, the ASBCA began in 1964 to apply provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to federal contracts because "LwJe believe the Code governs as re-
137
 Gardiner Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.
1973).
138
 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1976).
"9
 67-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 30,468 (ASBCA 1967).
140 Id. at 30,472-73, citing Commercial Molasses Corp.' v. New York Tank Barge
Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1911). A good definition of federal bailment law is set
forth in United States v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage Company, 286 F. Supp. 680 (N.D.
Iowa 1968), where the court stated: "The federal rule as to the negligence of a carrier
in handling goods is that once the shipper has proved a prima facie case the final
burden of proof shifts to the carrier to explain the loss." Id. at 682.
' 4 ' 67-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 30,468, 30,472-473 (ASBCA 1967).
'" Meeks Transfer Co., 68-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 32,644 (ASBCA 1968).
'" 161 Ct. Cl. 369 (1963).
14 Id. at 377.
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fleeting the best in modern decision and discussion ...." 145 From 1964
through 1966, Article 2 provisions were applied a total of six times by three
separate boards of appeal in resolution of federal contract litigation.'" Un-
certainty, however, existed among the various boards conerning the proper
status of the U.C.C. as federal law. Most boards considered the Code to be a
convenient source for the formulation of federal contract law. 147 Some, how-
ever, appeared to view Article 2 as a valid articulation of federal common
law.'" But in May of 1966, Judge Friendly issued, his opinion in Weg-
ematic.' 49 This opinion constituted the'first judicial statement of Article 2's status
as federal contract law. Subsequently, the ASBCA issued its decision in
Meeks 15°
 explaining that the Code is not federal law but merely a source to be
utilized only in the absence of relevant federal precedent. 15 ' In doing so, the
ASBCA adopted the same policy regarding Article 2 utilization as that fol-
lowed by the various circuits. This decision of federal circuit courts and
boards of contract appeal to consider Code provisions only in the absence of
relevant federal precedent, however, has had the practical effect of delegating
to the Court of Claims the major responsibility for integrating Article 2 provi-
sions into federal common contract law.
15
 Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 1964 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 20,869, 20,877
(ASBCA 1964).
1 " Productions Unlimited, Inc., 66-I C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 25,511, 25,515
(VACAB 1966); General Electric Co., 66-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 25,785, 25,792
(IBCA 1966); General Electric Co., 65-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,454, 23,457-58
(IBCA 1965); Mazur Bros. and Jaffe Fish Co., 65-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,303,
23,305 (VACAB 1965); Carpenter Steel Co., 65-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 22,942,
22,944 (AECBCA 1965); Federal Pacific Electric Co., 1964 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App.
21,582, 21,585 (IBCA 1964).
147
 Carpenter Steel Co., 65-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 22,942, 22,944 (AECBCA
1965); General Electric Co., 65-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,454, 23,457-58 (IBCA
1965); Mazur Bros. and Jaffe Fish Co., 65-2 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 23,303, 23,305
(VACAB 1965); Federal Pacific Electric Co., 1964 C.C.H. Rd. Cont. App. 21,582,
21,585 (IBCA 1964).
1 " General Electric Co., 66-I G.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 25,785, 25,792 (IBCA
1966); Productions Unlimited, Inc., 66-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 25,511, 25,515
(VACAB 1966).
"9 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966). See
also text at note 77, supra.
1 " Meeks Transfer Co., 68-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 32,644, 32,644 (ASBCA
1968).
151 Id. One writer has suggested that the board in Meeks was concerned with a
conflict between the U.C.C. and federal contract common law. Note, Application of the
Uniform Commercial Code to Federal Government Contracts: Doing Business On Business
Terms, 16 WM. & MARY L..REv. 395, 402-04 (1974). A more likely interpretation, how-
ever, is that the board in Meeks was not faced with a conflict between the U.C.C. and
federal common law. In United States v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage Co., 286 F. Supp.
680 (N.D. Iowa 1968), 7-403(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, absent optional
language adopted at the time by only eight states, was "held to in substance codify
previous majority and federal rules." Id. at 682. The assumption that the government
in Meeks had included the optional, minority provision in its promotion of the Code as
federal common law is unfounded. Meeks, therefore, should be read as declaring a
board policy of applying federal case law to federal contract actions even where the
U.C.C. is not in conflict. See 68-1 C.C.H. Bd. Cont. App. 32,644.
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3. United States Court of Claims
The Court of Claims has taken not one but four separate approaches in
utilizing Article 2 provisions as federal contract law. Initially, the court has
endorsed the circuit court and board of contract appeal approach by relying
primarily upon existing federal case law while using the U.C.C. as a suppor-
tive backdrop where possible. Consistent with this policy, the court has also
rejected Article 2 provisions which conflict with existing federal contract prec-
edent and has utilized relevant code provisions only in the absence of applica-
ble federal case law. Finally, the Court of Claims appears to have used the
Uniform Commercial Code sporadically to balance federal with private con-
tract interests while preserving the force of prior federal contract common
law. Since the majority of federal contract common law is formulated by the
Court of Claims, each of these four approaches will be examined in detail.
As basic underlying policy, the court appears to have adopted the familiar
approach of relying primarily upon existing federal precedent while citing
Article 2 provisions merely in support of the result. In Natus Corporation v.
United States,' 52 for example, the court was called upon to decide whether the
production and delivery of 18,000,000 square feet of portable steel airplane
landing mat in accordance with the terms of a federal procurement contract
was commercially impracticable. After first referring to the common law doc-
trine of impossibility, the court admitted the existence of its modern equiva-
lent in commercial impracticability, but listed U.C.C. § 2-615 (Comment 3) last
among available "expressions". 153 The court then quoted from the District of
Columbia Circuit Court opinion in Transatlantic Financing Corp.'" to express
the official meaning and purpose of federal impracticability.' 55 The Court of
Claims made no reference, however, to the significant reliance of the court in
Transatlantic upon the Uniform Commercial Code in formulating this
federalized version of the impracticability doctrine.'" Furthermore, although
Natus was concerned with the sale of goods and, therefore, the Article 2 pro-
visions underlying Transatlantic were entirely applicable, the Court of Claims
chose instead to apply consistent federal precedent.
'" 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
1 " Id. at 456. U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 3 states:
The first test for excuse under this Article in terms of basic assumption is a
familiar one. The additional test of commercial impracticability (as con-
trasted with "impossibility," "frustration of performance" or "frustration of
the venture") has been adopted in order to call attention to the commercial
character of the criterion chosen by this Article.
1$4 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
155 The court stated that "the doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting
line, drawn by the courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at
which the community's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms is
outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance." Natus Corp. v.
United States, 371 F.2d 450, 456 (Ct. Cl. 1967), quoting Transatlantic Financial Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d at 315.
I" Judge Wright, in Transatlantic, relied primarily upon U.C.C. §§ 2-614, 2-615.
See 363 F.2d at 315-20.
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Similarly, in Cities Service Helex, Inc. v. United Stales,'" the court looked to
Article 2 provisions merely for support after basing its decision upon available
federal precedent. Cities Service Helex involved claims for contract price plus
interest brought by two companies who had contracted to produce and sell
helium to the government over a 22 year period. These contracts corres-
ponded with a long-range federal program 158 designed to conserve the gas as
a natural resource. 159 Approximately eight years into the program, the gov-
ernment notified plaintiffs that no payments would be made for further de-
liveries of helium. Plaintiffs thereupon obtained a court injunction preserving
the contract and requiring the government to accept delivery. When a second
notice of termination was later upheld,"° the government ceased accepting
deliveries of helium. The plaintiffs then brought suit on a breach of contract
theory to recover value plus interest for helium delivered during the injunc-
tive period. The government, citing strict election of remedies doctrine,
moved for partial summary judgment to prevent plaintiffs from claiming, as
an independent breach of contract, federal non-payment for the heliuM
delivered prior to the second termination.'" Plaintiffs cited U.C.C.
§§ 1-207 162 and 2-703 (Comment 1) 183 in defense. The court refused to employ
Code provisions to override traditional federal caselaw and granted the gov-
ernment's motion on an election of remedies theory. 164 Nevertheless, the
court cited eight Article 2 provisions to exemplify the importance of prompt
and specific action in the preservation of legal rights and particularly to dem-
onstrate that plaintiffs' claim also was untenable under the U.C.C." 5 The
Court of Claims found Article 2 useful, therefore, in demonstrating the simi-
larity between general and federal contract law, but not as a basis for the
federal decision.
The natural consequence of a court policy which extends priority to exis-
tent federal precedent over relevant and consistent U.C.C. provisions is out-
'" 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
158 Helium Act Amendments of 1960 § 2, 50 U.S.C. §§ 167(a)-167(n).
' 59 543 F.2d at 1308.
159 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
543 F.2d at 1312.
182 U.C.C. § 1-207 provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises
performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered
by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such
words as "without prejudice," "under protest," or the like are sufficient.
U.C.C. § 2-703, Comment 1 states:
This section is an index section which gathers together in one convenient
place all of the various remedies open to a seller for any breach by the
buyer. This Article rejects any doctrine of election or remedy as a funda-
mental policy and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature
and include all of the available remedies for breach. Whether the pursuit
of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual
case.
'`" 543 F.2d at 1319.
185 Id. at 1317-18, nn.29 & 30, citing U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 2-606(1)(b), 2-607(3),
2-608(2), 2-612(3), 2-616, 2-703, 2-711.
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right rejection of the Code where inconsistent with federal caselaw. Such was
the result in Federal Electric Corp. v. United States.'" The plaintiff corporation,
desiring to be released from an unprofitable contract, notified the govern-
ment that it was withdrawing its offer to supply as yet unordered contract
items, that the contract was enforceable only to the extent of orders already
received, that at government insistence subsequent orders would be filled, but
that such action would not constitute a waiver of plaintiff's right to re-
negotiate the contract price."' When plaintiff brought suit to recover addi-
tional expenses, the court refused to honor plaintiff's reservation of rights
under U.C.C. § 1-207, 1 " and held the contract enforceable to the extent per-
formed.' 69
In support of this decision the court relied upon federal precedent con-
tained in two Supreme Court cases "° which explicitly rejected the concept of
continued performance after reservation of rights. The court explained that:
Though we might find persuasive the contemporary view of perfor-
mance under protest as restated in section 1-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ... we hesitate to extend this view in the face of a
clear, contrary rule established and affirmed, albeit a half century
ago, by the Supreme Court."'
By basing its decision upon Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Claims
avoided the necessity of explaining its rejection of Article 2 provisions. Any
contrary federal precedent apparently would produce the same result under
the court's demonstrated policy of applying federal case law whenever possi-
ble.
Mechanical adherence to established federal precedent, however, is not
only contrary to the Court of Claims's commitment "to take account of the
best in modern decision and discussion," 12 but also blocks a parallel de-
velopment of federal contract law with the law followed by "other contractors
under analogous situations." 13 In the absence of relevant federal precedent
the Court of Claims, in fact, has applied Article 2 provisions as federal con-
tract law. This third approach to federal utilization of the U.C.C. by the Court
of Claims appears in the case of John C. Kohler Co. v. United States.' In
Kohler, a contractor who installed a new boiler for the government sued to
recover the costs of repair after the boiler exploded during normal use. A
166 486 F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
'" Id. at 1379-80.
See note 162 supra.
169 486 F.2d at 1382.
' 7 ° In Willard, Sutherland Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 492, 494 (1923),
the Court held a contract for delivery of an unspecified amount of coal, though un-
enforceable at inception due to lack of consideration and mutuality, enforceable to the
extent performed regardless of plaintiff's reservation of rights. In Early & Daniel Co.
v. United States, 271 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1926), performance, though under protest, was
held to waive rights to additional compensation under a federal supply contract.
171 Federal Electric Corp., 486 F.2d at 1382.
172 Padblock Co. v. United States, 161 Ct.C1. 369, 377 (1963).
173 United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, III (1944).
194 498 F.2d 1360 (Ct.C1. 1974).
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major issue on appeal was whether acceptance of delivery had occurred be-
fore the damage was incurred.'m Although the boiler had been operated by
government employees for nearly three months, the government denied tak-
ing possession. The contract provided for written notice of installation and
official inspection before final acceptance of contract performance.'" Since
written notice of installation had not been given by the contractor, the gov-
ernment claimed that the required inspection and, hence, final acceptance
had never occurred.'" With only a footnote comment,'" the court applied
U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) 1 " as the federal definition of acceptance. Although the
court did not specifically state its rationale, the reason appears obvious. Ac-
ceptance of performance is a basic contract principle, applicable to federal as
well as commercial contracts. The formulation of a unique, federal definition
without convincing justification would conflict with the Supreme Court's di-
rective to treat the United States "as other contractors under analogous situa-
tions."'" Since a federal agency had merely purchased one boiler, no special
federal interests or policies were involved. The Uniform Commercial Code,
therefore, could be safely utilized as a source for federal contract common law
formulation.
These three approaches to federal utilization of Article 2 provisions com-
plement and reinforce the policy embraced by the federal circuits and boards
of contract appeal. The Court of Claims, however, has also used Article 2
provisions to resolve federal contract disputes in the face of consistent, and
even contrary, federal precedent. In doing so the court has developed a
unique method of balancing federal and private interests using Article 2
provisions while preserving the force of prior federal case law. The court
manages to do this by first distinguishing the Code from the body of federal
contract common law in order to apply selected Article 2 provisions as excep-
tions to normal federal precedent.
This fourth approach became apparent in 1969 in Everett Plywood and
Door Corp. v. United States."' In that case a contractor had successfully bid
for the right to cut an estimated yield of timber located on inaccessible gov-
ernment land. When actual yield fell far short of the published estimate, the
contractor sued to recover the difference as damages on an express warranty
claim. 1 B 2
 Two kinds of express warranties—stemming from specifications
contained in federal contracts and applicable in this case—previously had
1 " Id. at 1364.
176
 Id. at 1365.
177 Id.
1 " Id. at 1367 n.6.
'" U.C.C. § 2-606 provides:
1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is
wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
18Q United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. at III.
18 ' 419 F.2d 425 (Ct.C1. 1969).
1112
 Id. at 426-29.
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been recognized by the Supreme Court respectively in Hollerbach v. United
States 183 and Christie v. United States.'" In awarding the plaintiff damages for
breach of an express warranty, the Court of Claims found U.C.C. § 2-313 185
to be the "fair and just law applicable in the instant case . . . ," 1 " and used the
federal precedent merely to support its decision.'" A close examination of
the court's action reveals the emergence of a new, utilitarian approach to-
wards Article 2 application.
On evidence presented, the court found the government responsible for
the undercut of timber.'" The area to be cleared was vaguely defined as
well as inaccessible, thus justifying plaintiff's reliance on the published esti-
mate.'" Due in part to complicated provisions tying recovery of plaintiff's
costs in constructing and maintaining a road to the total amount of timber to
be recovered, the government's published estimate was found by the court to
183 233 U.S. 165 (1914). Hollerbach involved an unconditional express warranty.
The contractor was awarded damages resulting from reliance on misstatements of
material fact regarding the type of material used as dam backing regardless of contract
terms cautioning the contractor not to rely upon the contract description but to inde-
pendently investigate the work site. Id. at 172.
1 " 237 U.S. 234 (1915). Christie involved a conditional express warranty—
namely, a warranty applicable to material representations of fact on which the contrac-
tor was justified in relying. The contractor here had relied on government drawings
and bore samples in bidding on an excavation job. He recovered increased costs be-
cause the material to be excavated was not in actuality as represented by the govern-
ment. Id. at 239-42. The Court noted government knowledge of contrary conditions,
plaintiff's reliance on the representations, and the impracticability of independent test-
ing by the plaintiff. Id. at 240-42.
"s
	 2-313 provides:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
(b) Any description .of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use format words such as "warranty" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opin-
ion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
1 " Everett Plywood and Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d at 429 (emphasis
added).
' 87
 The Court of Claims had already applied both warranties as federal contract
law. See Dale Construction Co. v. United States, 168 Ct.CI. 692 (1965); Dunbar and
Sullivan Dredging Co. v. United States, 65 Ct.a. 567 (1928). These two cases, how-
ever, were cited by the court in Everett merely for support. 419 F.2d at 431-33. Since §
2-313 had been found applicable simply "in the instant case," 419 F.2d at 429, the
court's action may be interpreted as a reaffirmance of underlying federal case law.
88
 419 F.2d at 429.
188 Id. at 430-31.
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be an important basis of the final bargain. 19 " Most importantly, the Forest
Service, through misplaced confidence in the accuracy of its estimate, had
refused to utilize an approved contract form which contained a disclaimer of
warranty as to quantity." As a result, plaintiff upon performance sustained
damages in excess of $250,000 through no fault of his own.'"
As previously noted, two federal warranty theories stood ready for the
court's use. The first, established by the Supreme Court in Hollerbach, made
positive statements of material fact within federal contracts binding upon the
government to the extent of actual detrimental reliance shown by a contrac-
tor.'" Under these circumstances, contractors were specifically relieved of
any responsibility to independently examine and verify such "warranted"
facts.'" A second, less protective warranty covering factual representations
suggested by contract drawings was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Christie v. United States. 1" To recover on this warranty theory as subsequently
applied, a contractor was required to demonstrate justified reliance—the ab-
sence of governmental caution regarding the reliability of the representations
coupled with the impracticability of pre-contract verification.'" Since the
Forest Service had not disclaimed an implied warranty of quantity, and since
the contractor had justifiably relied upon the government's published esti-
mate, the Christie warranty appeared applicable.
Both of the warranties set forth in Hollerbach and Christie, however, were
qualified by the prior Supreme Court decision in Brawley v. United States.'"
The Court in Brawley held that good faith estimates of quantity regarding
goods sold by specific lot are not warrantable representations of fact.'" The
Court of Claims was thus faced with the task of balancing the justified claim
of a federal contractor with the express policy of the Supreme Court not to
create a federal warranty of quantity. Application of the Christie warranty in
' 9 ° Id.
191 hi. at 430.
'" Id. at 433.
193
 Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914).
194 Id.
1" 237 U.S. 234, 240, 242 (1915).
199 See Dale Construction Co. v. United States, 168 Ct.CI. 692, 703-04 (1965).
197 96 U.S. l68 (1877). The case concerned a requirements contract which
bound the plaintiff to supply such wood as needed by an army post at an estimated
total of 880 cords. Id. at 173. Only forty cords of wood were actually purchased. The
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's subsequent claim for breach of contract. Id. at
173-74.
199
 The Court stated:
Where a contract is made to sell or furnish certain goods identified by
reference to independent circumstances, such as an entire lot deposited in
a certain warehouse, or all that may be manufactured by the vendor in a
certain establishment, ... and the quantity is named with the qualification
of "about" or "more or less", or words of like import, the contract applies
to the specific lot; and the naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the
nature of a warranty, but only as an estimate of the probable amount, in
reference to which good faith is all that is required of the . party making it.
Id. at 171.
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Everett would create a troublesome federal precedent. To avoid this result, the
Court of Claims distinguished Brawley from the case before it on the basis that
the parties in Everett had actually contracted to cut and carry a specified
amount of timber 199
 and turned to Article 2, which it clearly qualified as the
"fair and just law applicable in the instant case ...." In utilizing § 2-313, the
court neither replaced federal precedent with a Code provision nor added an
Article 2 provision to the available body of federal contract common law.'"
Instead, the court merely identified Article 2 as an independent source of
modern sales law useful in achieving equitable results in particular contract
situations. Applied solely in this respect, the Code more closely resembles a
federal tool than an available source for federal contract law formulation.
With Northern Helex Co. v. United States,' the court more clearly revealed its
Code-as-tool approach to contract dispute resolution.
Northern Helex presented a substantially similar fact situation as that found
in Cities Service Helex, 2 "—a 22 year contract to produce and sell helium to the
government pursuant to a long-range federal program to preserve natural
resources. The plaintiff in Northern Helex produced helium in conjunction
with its usual petrochemical operations. The company had no storage facilities
or regular helium customers, but sold helium solely to the government pur-
suant to contract. The plaintiff responded to the government's notice of ter-
mination by claiming an immediate, material breach of contract but continued
to make deliveries "in mitigation of damages and in the interests of conserva-
tion." 20
  On cross motions for summary judgment, the court decided only
the issues of materiality of breach and possible waiver. The court first charac-
terized plaintiff's notice as a reservation of rights under U.C.C. § 1-207, 2"
and then found the plaintiff's continued performance to be commercially
'" 419 F.2d at 431-32. The court also distinguished the case of Brock v. United
States, 84 Ct.C1. 453 (1937), in which a contractor who had agreed to cut and buy an
estimated amount of timber on government land had sued on an express warranty
theory to recover his losses. The court explained that since the plaintiff in Brock was
familiar with the area to be cleared, no justifiable reliance on the published estimate
could be shown. In addition, it noted that no evidence existed establishing government
estimates of quantity as the basis of agreement. 419 F.2d at 433. As a result, the court
concluded that no warranty was created in Brock. Id.
20' Acceptance of the Code warranty as federal law would have conflicted with
the Christie warranty established earlier by the Supreme Court. See U.C.C. § 2-313,
Comment 3:
... In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the
goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in
order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.
201 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
202 543 F.2d 306 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See text at notes 152-60 supra.
202 455 F.2d at 549.
204 Id. at 552. See note 162 supra.
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reasonable in accordance with U.C.C. §§ 2-703(c) 205 and 2-704(2). 2" The
court explained: "We are convinced of the fairness of following the modern
U.G.C. rule in this case because of the harshness of a contrary result on our
special facts, where cessation of production was commercially impossible and
avoidance of waste most desirable."'" Reservations of rights under U.C.C.
§ 1-207, however, was not necessary to preserve the breach remedies of
§ 2-704. 2" In addition, the Supreme Court had specifically rejected the princi-
ple of continued performance after reservation of rights.'" The Court of
Claims nevertheless insisted upon linking the two Code provisions when
applied to resolve federal contract disputes. While the court did not specifi-
cally explain the rationale underlying this action, elements of the code-as-tool
approach are discernible.
An application of U.C.C. § 2-704(2) alone in Northern. Helex would not
have provided the Court of Claims with sufficient grounds to distinguish that
case in the future.21° Section 2-704(2) would appear as an integrated part of
2" 455 F.2d at 553. U.C.C. § 2-703 provides:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails
to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to
a part or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if
the breach is of the whole contract ... then also with respect to the whole
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified
to the contract.
2 " 455 F.2d at 553. U.C.C. § 2-704(2) provides:
Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may in the exer-
cise of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes Of avoiding
loss and of effective realization either complete the manufacture and
wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease manufacture and
resell for scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable
manner.
2"
 455 F.2d at 553 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's suit claimed $83,632,368
as due. Id. at 548.
2O U.C.C. § 1-207, Comment 2 states:
... The section is not addressed to the creation or loss of remedies in
the ordinary course or performance but rather to a method of pro-
cedure where one party is claiming as of right something which the
other feels to be unwarranted.
202 Early & Daniel Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 140, 142 (1926); Willard,
Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 494 (1923).
210
 General application of § 2-704 would have changed existing federal contract
law. Compare 5 S. WiLusToN, A TREATISE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1961):
[W]herever a contract not already fully performed on either side is con-
tinued in spite of a known excuse, the defense thereupon is lost and the
injured party is himself liable if he subsequently fails to perform, unless
the right to retain the excuse is not only asserted but assented to.
(cited by the Court of Claims in Northern Helex, 455 F.2d at 551) with note 206 supra.
In addition, straight adoption of U.C.C. § 2-704 would have placed the burden of
proving commercial unreasonableness upon the government. Consider U.C.C. § 2-704,
Comment 2:
Under this Article the seller is given express power to complete man-
ufacture or procurement of goods for the contract unless the exercise of
reasonable commercial judgment as to the facts as they appear at the time
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federal contract common law, applicable at any time hence as federal prece-
dent. Since the underlying principles of § 1-207 had been rejected earlier by
the Supreme Court,'" the Court of Claims was able to limit that provision's
application to "particular circumstances" in "specific cases." 212 By making
continuance of performance under § 2-704 contingent upon reservation of
rights under § 1-207, this additional control was extended to both provisions.
The court subsequently characterized its action in Northern Helex as a neces-
sary response to special circumstances rather than the creation of new federal
contract law.'" In doing so the court consciously rejected Article 2 as an
acceptable source for federal law reformation or change and, instead, forged
a new federal contract tool. The Court of Claims then used the combination
of ** 1-207 and 2-704 to reward the commercially reasonable conduct of the
plaintiff in Northern Helex without sacrificing federal policy concerning waiver
of claims by continued performance.
In summary, the federal judiciary, when faced with the task of formulat-
ing a body of federal contract law uniform in scope as well as fair in applica-
tion, has clung to traditional contract principles as reflected in existing federal
case law. These courts have, in addition, refused to allow the contract provi-
sions of U.C.C. Article 2 to change established common contract law. Instead,
Article 2 is utilized most often either for support, when consistent with exist-
ing precedent, or as a unique legal tool when absolutely necessary to achieve
fair and just results without changing the underlying legal structure. Whether
he learns of the breach makes it clear that such action will result in a mate-
rial increase in damages. The burden is on the buyer to show the commer-
cially unreasonable nature of the seller's action in completing manufacture.
The court, therefore, did not wish to accept these provisions as general federal con-
tract law.
211 See note 209 supra.
2t2 Federal Electric Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1377, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
213 The court first limited the general precedential value of Northern Helex in
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 630 (1973):
In Northern Helex we found "particular circumstances [centering on the
need to prevent waste of heliuml justifying further performance in the
specific case" 455 F.2d at 551-52, 553 ... but even then we rested, equally,
on the significant facts that that contractor had made an express reserva-
tion of its rights when it continued performance, and that the "Gov-
ernment was not hurt and it did not change its position." .. • The court
was at pains to spell out the "special aspect" and the "special facts" of that
case, ... which permitted the contractor to continue performance while at
the same time claiming total breach.
Id. at 637 (emphasis in original). In Cities Service Helex, the Court again focusd on the
uniqueness of Northern Helex:
The position adopted in Northern Helex Co. v. United States . . . allowed a
plaintiff to claim a material, contract-ending breach—despite having con-
tinued performance—only in the context of that plaintiff's explicit reserva-
tion of material breach claims, explanations in advance of the reasons for
its continued performance, prompt suit before the Government took any
action to terminate, the lack of prejudice to the Government, and other
special factors.
543 F.2d at 1315-16.
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these courts have clone a "distinct disservice" to insist on traditional federal
contract law "for the segment of commerce, important but still small in rela-
tion to the total, consisting of transactions with the United States"' should
be determined in reference to the type of contract law permitted by the doc-
trine of federal common law and required by the nature of federal contract-
ing.
III. EVALUATION
A body of federal contract law which satisfactorily balances unique fed-
eral policies with private commercial goals has yet to he formulated. Neverthe-
less, important and desirable aspects of such a law can be identified. The
federal rule should at least be uniform and consistent with national interests,
since these are key factors in the initial decision to formulate federal common
law:215 As the backdrop for complex bargaining, 2 " basic federal contract
principles should be clear, concise and dependable. Finally, the law under
which the federal government buys or sells goods should fairly protect not
only the attainment of important national goals, but the bargained-for in-
terests of private contractors. The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted and
applied in forty-nine states,217 has been termed "a truly national law of com-
merce"219 and "a source of 'federal law' ... more complete and more certain,
than any other which can conceivably be drawn from those sources of 'general
law' to which we were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson. " 219
Yet, boards of contract appeal, the federal courts, and the Court of Claims
have demonstrated extreme caution, if not reluctance, in the application of
Article 2 provisions to federal contract disputes. This final section will pro-
pose and examine plausible reasons for such hesitancy towards Code utiliza-
tion while evaluating the various approaches toward Article 2 utilization which
have been followed by the federal contracting boards and courts.
An apparent barrier to federal court utilization of U.C.C. provisions is
the refusal by Congress to adopt the Code for federal use. Such action would
provide a clear and concise body of commercial law consistent with that fol-
2 " United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
215 See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); Clear-
field Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 367.
2 " While government contracts are technically contracts of adhesion with set terms,
bargaining between the government and industry representatives does occur. See. Pas-
ley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: 4 Plea For Better Understanding, 25 FORD.
L. Rev. 211, 214 (1956). In regards to "negotiated" government contracts, an aware-
ness of underlying federal contract law is important in order to anticipate in individual
negotiations the demands that will be made in subsequent contract performances. See
J. PAUL, UNITED STATES CONTRACTS & SUBCONTRACTS, 163-66, 173-74 (1964).
217 See note 2 supra.
' United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
219 New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 180 F.2d
241, 244 (2d Cir. 1950) (originally cited in reference to the U.C.C. by Justice Friendly
in United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d at 676, and subsequently by the Court
of Claims in Everett Plywood and Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d at 430, and
Groves v. United States, 202 Ct. CI. 660, 674 (1973)).
May 19791	 FEDERAL CONTRACT COMMON LAW 	 711
lowed by the states. This goal led Mr. Justice Clark, in Bank of America Na-
tional Trust and Savings Association v. United States, 22° to specifically request
congressional action.
The commercial interests of our country would be better served
if interested parties could expect uniformity in the federal and state
courts' application of commercial law. To this end, we would urge
Congress to adopt, in the not distant future, the U.C.C. for federal
application, as our fifty states have already done for local applica-
tion."'
Nevertheless, Congress has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as
federal law. This refusal might be interpreted as congressional rejection of
Code logic and provisions. The failure of Congress to adopt the U.C.C. as
federal law, however, should not be attributed to congressional disapproval of
the Code as a body of commercial law since, in 1963, Congress officially ac-
cepted the U.C.C. for application within the District of Columbia. 222 A more
plausible explanation is that Congress simply chose not to commit federal con-
tracting to the Code in order to pursue, through federal contracts, such inde-
pendent goals as national security, 223 the preservation of natural resources, 224
and the attainment of various social welfare ends. 225 Specific federal regula-
tion can be more easily tailored in such situations towards achieving the de-
sired result.226 Congressional rejection of the Code as federal statutory law,
therefore, should not be misconstrued as a negative evaluation of the useful-
ness of Article 2 as federal law.
Federal courts are free to utilize Code provisions to formulate federal
common law in any way consistent with congressional policies. Where unique
federal interests are not involved, federal courts have been willing to accept
Code provisions as federal common law. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in United States v. Next,'" commented: "We perceive no reasons
why the rights of the United States arising out of secured transactions pur-
suant to the FHA loan program should be any different than those of other
220
	 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1977).
221 Id. at 303 n.l. Justice Clark's comments were directed to Articles 3 and 4
which have been adopted by all fifty states. See I UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED I (West
1977).
222 D.C. Code Ann. § 28 (1973 & Supp. IV 1977) (orginally enacted as Act of
December 30, 1963, 77 Stat. 630).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 292 (1942).
224
	
e.g., Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546, 551 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (preservation of helium).
2 " See Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to
an Unconstrained Administrative Process, Wisc. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (1974).
22s of such tailored provisions are 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.319, which requires
jewel bearings used in federal contracts to be purchased from a government owned
plant in North Dakota in order to "maintain a jewel bearing production plant in the
United States as part of the industrial mobilization base," and C.F.R. § 1-12.803-1,
which requires a lengthy equal opportunity clause to be included in each government
contract.
227 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
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financers of farming operations under the Uniform Commercial Code." 226
The court then accepted U.C.C. Article 9 as the federal common law of se-
cured transactions. 229 Deciding a similar issue in United States v. Burnette -Carter
Co.,'" the Sixth Circuit stated that: "We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit that the U.C.C. should be adopted as the relevant federal common
law." 2 " The court then applied Article 9 provisions to find a livestock
broker liable to the FHA for the sale of livestock which was subject to a per-
fected federal security interest. 232
It is essential that no unique federal interest be involved in federal pro-
grams governed entirely by the Uniform Commercial Code. Federal courts
which have accepted the Code as federal common law abandon the task of
juggling federal policy, federal interests and private expectations. Instead,
those courts simply "apply the rules found in 'the Code itself and the general
body of precedent developed by the Code states.' 233 Where this is possible,
adoption of the Code does indeed provide a concise, uniform body of law
readily available to courts and interested parties alike. As demonstrated
above,' however, federal boards of contract appeal, circuit courts, and the
Court of Claims have refused to accept Article 2 of the U.C.C. for general
application within federal contracts. Far from being a "distinct disservice",235
this action is reasonable and proper, as far as it goes, for two quite simple
reasons.
First, inherent in the Supreme Court's directive that federal contract
common law reflect, where possible, commercial contract principles 236 is the
limiting assumption that important federal objectives are not to be sacrificed
to achieve federal/state legal uniformity."' Federal contracts are not merely
commercial transactions, but also vehicles for the achievement of federal
policy—be that policy the procurement of necessary supplies or the promo-
tion of desired social change. 236 The nature of federal common law as out-
228 Id. at 810.
229 Id. This interpretation of Hext is directly supported by United States v. To-
peka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Stipp. 944, 948 (D.C.N.D. Ind. 1975): "The Uni-
form Commercial Code on secured transactions has been judicially adopted as the
federal common law as well. Hext, supra."
230 575 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1978).
231 Id. at 590.
232 Id. at 591-92. See also Mills Morris Co. of Miss. v. Scanlon, 446 F.2d 722, 732
(5th Cir. 1971). The Court of Claims has also apparently recognized Article 9 of the
U.C.C. as the federal common law of secured transactions. See Cleveland Chair Co. v.
United States, 557 F.2d 244, 246 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Groves v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl.
660, 674 (1973); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 343,
345-46 (1973).
233
	 States v, Burnette-Carter Co., 575 F.2(.1 587, 590 (6th Cir. 1978).
234 See text at notes 113-213 supra.
232 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d at 676.
236 United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. at 111.
237
	 Supreme Court, in Standard Rice, specifically recognized that "there will
be exceptions „ ." to the general policy of treating the United States as "other contrac-
tors under analogous situations." Id.
gas
	 Commission on Government Procurement has listed 39 contract clauses
designed to further national policies. 1 COMMISSION ON GOVERNUENT PROCUREMENT,
REPORT III, 114-15 (1972).
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lined above 239 requires that these important federal interests be balanced with
state interests in the formulation of the governing federal rule. The Uniform
Commercial Code is not designed to promote such a balance."° This some-
times complicated task appears to require the flexibility of federal common
law rather than the uniformity of a civil code.
Second, the assumption that universal acceptance of Article 2 as federal
common law will painlessly produce uniform federal contract law is insup-
portable. Either method for federal utilization of Code provisions—state law
adoption or judicial acceptance—necessarily occurs within the context of indi-
vidual cases and in reference to particular contracts. Article 2 provisions,
otherwise relevant, may be rendered totally irrelevant or altered in meaning
and impact by specific contract provisions or federal contract regulations. 24 '
Those Code sections which conflict with federal policy or statutes would be
rejected outright. 242 To insist, therefore, that federal courts now accept and
apply Article 2 provisions exclusively as federal common law is in reality to
require the application of "federal" contract law where necessary and Article 2
provisions whenever possible. While uniformity of law is desirable, legal pre-
dictability in contracting is almost essential. 243
Certainly the easiest method of attaining any measure of dependability in
federal contracting law is to preserve relevant federal precedent. Justice
Holmes, commenting upon the nature of common law in general, observed
that "the substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so
far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and
machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results,
239 See text at notes 73-79 supra.
240 The Uniform Commercial Code has listed its primary objectives in
1-102(2):
a. to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial trans-
actions;
b. to permit the continued expansion of commercial pracitices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
c. to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
241 See Gusman, Article 2 of the U.C.C. and Government Procurement: Selected Areas
of Discussion, 9 B.C. INDUS. & Comm. L. Rev. 1, 7-18 (1967). The author points out, for
example, that federal contract regulations may limit federal use of U.C.C. § 2-706
(permitting acceptance of an offer in any reasonable manner) and 2-707 (recognizing
the validity of acceptances containing additional terms) to situations in which either the
government or contractor attempt to avoid an agreement on the ground that contract
formalities were not perfectly observed. Id. at 7-10.
242 DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. at 581; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). See also Mishkin, supra note 34, at 805-06.
243 SeCtion 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code specfically recognizes the
right of parties to choose applicable law before contracting. U.C.C. § 1-105(a) pro-
vides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
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depends very much upon its past. " 244 In respect to contract law, these obser-
vations are particularly apt. Federal contract common law, at present, repre-
sents a formulated compromise between federal policy and individual in-
terests. Federal contractors are familiar with this law and rely upon it in both
bidding and contract performance. 245 With federal adoption of Article 2, all
necessary exceptions will not only be made after contract performance, these
exceptions will be made exclusively in favor of the government. To avoid this
result, the Court of Claims has resolutely applied familiar federal contract
precedent while utilizing the Code only in favor of individual contractors. 246
In this way federal contractors know in advance the balance struck by federal
courts between federal and commercial interests.They also know that the
U.C.C. may be applied as an exception to established federal precedent
whenever balance and fairness so require.
To apply Article 2 provisions simply in mitigation of glaring inequities or
in the absence of relevant federal precedent, however, is to shirk the difficult,
though necessary task of federal contract common law reevaluation. The fact
that federal contract precedent exists is no guarantee that all of it should
exist. As the court in Transatlantic Finance 247 recognized, federal contract
common law needs updating and change at times in order to efficiently serve
both federal and private interests. The widespread acceptance of the Uniform
Commercial Code qualifies Article 2 as a model for federal contract law re-
form. Federal courts and boards of contract appeal should review established
federal contract precedent in light of Code developments. The result should
be a body of clear, concise contract law with sufficient flexibility to protect
reasonable contractor expectations as well as national interests.
CONCLUSION
Although provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code have been utilized
by federal courts in the resolution of federal contract disputes, Article 2 itself
has not been generally accepted as the federal common law of contracts. In-
stead, federal courts and boards of contract appeal have consistently distin-
guished federal contract law based on existent federal precedent from Article
2 provisions, preferring to utilize Article 2 either for support or as a source
for federal contract law formulation in the absence of relevant precedent. The
Court of Claims has, in addition, sporadically applied the Code as a unique
legal tool under the particular circumstances of individual contract disputes.
These efforts are apparently directed towards the formulation and preserva-
tion of a uniform, federal law of contracts capable of protecting national in-
terests while guaranteeing the reasonable realization of bargained for return.
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Code adoption, Article 2 should not be overlooked as a source of concise,
modern contract law in the formulation of new federal contract law nor in the
development and change of old. The goal should be a body of federal con-
tract law responsive to federal policy yet containing the unity, clarity and
commercial reasonableness of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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